In recent years, researchers have come up with proof of concepts of seemingly benign applications such as InstaStock and Jekyll that remain dormant until triggered by an attacker-crafted condition, which activates a malicious behavior, eluding code review and signing mechanisms. In this paper, we make a step forward by describing a stealthy injection vector design approach based on Return Oriented Programming (ROP) code reuse that provides two main novel features: 1) the ability to defer the specification of the malicious behavior until the attack is struck, allowing fine-grained targeting of the malware and reuse of the same infection vector for delivering multiple payloads over time; 2) the ability to conceal the ROP chain that specifies the malicious behavior to an analyst by using encryption. We argue that such an infection vector might be a dangerous weapon in the hands of advanced persistent threat actors. As an additional contribution, we report on a preliminary experimental investigation that seems to suggest that ROP-encoded malicious payloads are likely to pass unnoticed by current security solutions, making ROP an effective malware design ingredient.
Dettaglio pubblicazione
2019, SAC '19 Proceedings of the 34th ACM/SIGAPP Symposium on Applied Computing, Pages 1962-1970
The ROP needle: Hiding trigger-based injection vectors via code reuse (04b Atto di convegno in volume)
Borrello P., Coppa E., D'Elia D. C., Demetrescu C.
ISBN: 9781450359337
Gruppo di ricerca: Cybersecurity