Seminario pubblico di Johannes Bruestle
Nell'ambito della procedura selettiva per il reclutamento di 1 ricercatore tipologia A tempo determinato PNRR PE1 FAIR SPOKE 5 GSD 09/IINF-05- SSD IINF-05/A, presso il Dipartimento di Ingegneria Informatica, Automatica e Gestionale Antonio Ruberti, bandita con D.D. n.10/2025, del 10/01/2025,codice concorso B53C22003980006, Joahnnes Bruestle terrà un seminario pubblico in data 5/3/2025, alle ore 16:00, presso l'aula B203 del DIAG, e incollegamento Meet, link alla videochiamata:
https://meet.google.com/tpt-pdnt-wqm?authuser=1
TItle: The effectiveness of simple mechanisms
Abstract:This talk explores two important themes in algorithmic mechanism design: online decision-making and robust mechanisms. We revisit the well studied problem of prophet inequalities by introducing different frameworks that account for additional information an algorithm may have and wishes to use in order to improve its approximation guarantees. In a new project, we also investigate the revenue of fixed price bilateral trade in an online learning setting. In robust mechanism design, we investigate manipulability in first-price auctions and analyze how much information is needed to construct approximately optimal multi-item mechanisms. In an ongoing project, we explore a form of democratic decision-making that has recently gained interest called sortition, where a uniformly random sample of the population is called upon to decide a given issue.
Short Bio: Johannes Brüstle grew up in Germany and Canad abefore earning his Bachelor’s and Master’s degrees in Mathematics and Computer Science at McGill University. He then completed his PhD at the London School of Economics under the supervision of Paul Dütting. Now based in Rome, his research focuses on Algorithmic Game Theory, with particular interest in decision-making under uncertainty, prophet inequalities, posted pricing, and bilateral trade.